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The main topic of this article concerns the question, whether the self-knowledge can be still authoritative from the enactivistic 
point of view. The problem rests on two assumptions: 1. The definition of self-knowledge claims that a subject has a direct given 
knowledge about an intentional contents of his attitudes. 2. The content of subject’s attitudes is determined by external factors, 
which could be unknown to the subject. It means that the subject has the limited access to the content or its determinants 
understood as satisfaction conditions of his mental states. On this basis of the obvious conflict between the two theses the first-
person-authority can be questioned. 
Introduction 
In this paper I want to consider the problem of the 
enactive cognition in reference to self-knowledge, 
which could be formulated after M. Wilson and Ch. 
Peacocke as it follows [1, р. 625; 2, р.  203]: 
1. The main thesis of enactivism claims that 
organisms including human subjects organize 
themselves by interacting with their environment. 
2. The definition of self-knowledge claims that a 
subject has the knowledge about the intentional 
contents of his attitudes without first checking their 
environmental relations.  
3. To understand cognition we must study the 
situation and the situated cognizer together as a single, 
unified system. 
The followers of the theories of embodied mind and 
enactivism would say that the content of subject’s mental 
states is deeply rooted in the body’s interactions with the 
environment because the whole cognition is. These 
theories characterises a focus on the neurobiological 
basis of the mind and models of the Self, which is 
reduced to its physical basis. According to these theories 
a subject is a system to which the self is necessary for 
proper functioning, and consciousness allows the 
system to control and to monitor these functions. The 
self has therefore any special ontological status. As 
Thomas Metzinger writes: “Subjective experience has 
not been developed in pursuing the old philosophical 
ideal of self-knowledge, but it has been evolutionarily 
successful, because it has enabled a more flexible form 
of action control.” [3, р. 175]. 
Such evolutionary position will therefore refer to the 
"needs" of the organism. Self-knowledge is required by 
human (called “system”) because it is useful to him. In 
the same way the problem of access to the mental 
content will be solved. Organisms (systems) in some 
cases need not know the broad context, which would 
influence the content of their thought. Metzinger 
assumes active externalism, which claims that “the 
content-fixing properties in the environment are active 
properties within a sensorimotor loop realized in the 
very present” [3, р. 115]. 
From that reasoning the following question arises: 
How to connect the first-person authority with the 
enactivism, which is de facto a new version of the 
externalism about content, if the judgments constituting 
a subject’s knowledge about his own mental states 
have a different epistemic status than the judgments 
constituting knowledge about the external world? Could 
the self-knowledge be still authoritative from the 
enactivistic point of view? 
The problem of the mental content determination 
The problem of this kind of determination concerns 
the nature of the content of mental states. The main 
question, which arises here sounds: How the content of 
mental states is determined? Is it determined by 
external or internal factors? It was said in the upper 
made quotation, that such factors are external to the 
subject. So how does he gain a knowledge about this 
content?  
This kind of knowledge, called de se, could be 
defined as a subject’s knowledge about his own mental 
states. This knowledge is infallible, direct and 
authoritative, which means that a subject has a 
privileged access to his own metal states. But this 
knowledge is possible only when there is a content 
constituting the propositional attitudes. In other words, 
the subject has certain beliefs only if he stands in some 
relation to the environment. It is a metaphysical 
statement about the intentional content of subject’s 
beliefs. Mental states like beliefs, desires and wishes 
have a propositional content that is expressed in the 
form of “that-clauses”. Such “that-clause” expressing the 
content of the belief is epistemically different from the 
first-person clause (i.e. “I believe…”). While the subject 
cannot be mistaken by the second-order belief (i.e. “I 
believe that I believe”), he might doubt content of his 
first-order belief (e.g. “I believe that at night every cat is 
black.”) because the content of the first-order belief is not 
self-verifying. The subject has to stay in relation to his 
environment and this environment is to what he refers 
when he expresses his first-order beliefs about 
something. The problem is, that the relation between a 
subject and an environment is not complete because the 
environment is external to him. That means, that the 
content of subjects attitudes can be in part determined 
by factors, which are unknown to the subject.  
On the other hand the statement: “I believe” is self-
verifying, because a subject cannot be wrong about it. 
If he has a belief, than he knows, that he has it. This 
statement is Cartesian like. Descartes’s paradigm for 
the self-knowledge was cogito. According to Descartes, 
“I think” leaves no doubts, that if I think, that I really do 
it. It leaves therefore no place for scepticism about me, 
as a subject, who make statements about his 
propositional attitudes. These sorts of judgements 
constitute knowledge in virtue of being made and 
having the content they do. 
From the internalistic point of view the problem of 
the content determination is related to the former 
paradigm in philosophy of mind namely the 
computational theory of mind. In this approach the 
content determination is described in terms of function 
(hence functional role semantic) because concepts, as 
a part of the content in propositional form, fall under a 
function. Using a concept in reference to an object 
means satisfaction of the function expressed by 
sentences. 
Since concepts are the basis constituents of the 
content it is noncoherent to claim that there exists 
something like nonconceptual representational content, 
because representation in such a theory is a sentence 
in the language of thoughts, where some parts of the 
sentence are concepts (hence they are parts of the 
representation as well), which are symbols. 
Hence on the assumption, that representations are 
functions, does not exist something like a separate 
representation of property F(x), and a separate 
representation of object a, because a representation of 
property is every time the representation of object F(a), 
because that needs a satisfaction of function (this point 
of view is connected with Freges thesis [4]). 
On the field of the computational theory of mind 
does not make a sense to consider, whether for 
example perceptual experience has a nonconceptual 
representational content, what is the subject of the 
dispute between McDowell [5], who is against the 
thesis, and Peacocke, who is agree with this thesis. 
Both of them assume the representational character of 
content. But they assume a different character of 
concepts. For Peacocke concepts are abstract objects 
and can be sometimes a part of the content and 
sometimes not. But if somebody regards concepts as 
symbols (like Fodor for example [6]), then the case is 
simple, because every single process of thinking 
(regardless, whether it is conscious or unconscious) 
consists of symbols.  
2. Externalist’s points of view about the possession 
of the concept of belief 
What could be such factors, which determine the 
content? To answer the question first we have to make 
two distinction: 
i. Between synchronic and diachronic externalism. 
ii. Between social and physical externalism. 
According to the (i.) synchronic externalism holds 
that the content of propositional attitudes is determined 
by an current environment of the subject and his 
disposition to respond to it. This externalism take into 
consideration only the actual situation of the subject, 
without reference to his causal story in the past.  
In contrast to this, diachronic externalism holds, that 
the causal story, that means, all facts in the past, which 
have had an influence on the subject, together with an 
environment, are important determinants of the content 
of subject’s propositional attitudes.  
According to (ii.) social externalism holds, that 
content of thoughts is determined in part by the social 
environment of a subject, especially by how others in 
our linguistic communities use words. This “others” 
could be experts, who establish and better know the 
scientific names of such objects like for example trees. 
This version of social externalism propagate Hilary 
Putnam and also Tylor Burge although their versions of 
social externalism are different.  
In opposition to the social externalism the physical 
externalism says that contents of subject’s thoughts is 
determined in part by our relation to our physical, non-
social environment. This kind of externalism was 
propagated for example by Donald Davidson. His basic 
statement claims, that the objects of our beliefs are 
causes of this beliefs [7, р. 151]. The main question, 
despite of the versions of externalism is: How is it 
possible, that a subject is able to know his own mental 
state, with a particular content, without having an idea, 
what constitutes this content?  
This is the place, where two aspects of self-
knowledge meet together: the metaphysical aspect 
concerning content, and epistemological aspect which 
concerns the subject’s capacity of attributing mental 
states to himself.  
The epistemic aspect of self-knowledge is 
interesting only in the situation where a subject 
attributes propositional attitudes with a particular 
content to himself. That is, only in the case of the 
clause: “I believe that…” but not “He (she) believes 
that…” It is a special capacity of human beings (for 
sure, animals – who knows?) to refer to himself, 
precisely, to his inner state. This capacity is called self-
reference, or reflective or reflective consciousness, or 
simple reflection. According to Davidson the act 
preceding the action understanding is simply the 
observation of an agent’s behavior. On this basis an 
interpreter ascribes to an agent intentions, beliefs, 
desires and other propositional attitudes. 
Davidson’s approach has important consequences 
for the first-person authority, because it seems to be 
obvious, that the thinker does not need to watch himself, 
that means, to watch his own behavior, to know, that he 
has a belief. Davidson’s argument, why it should be in 
that way, proceeds as follows [9, р. 395-396]: 
1. To have beliefs is to be an agent.  
2. To be an agent is to be capable of acting.  
3. To be capable of acting one must be able to have 
intentions. 
4. One’s beliefs and desires must be coordinated in 
the right way to provide rationalizations of one’s 
potential actions.  
Davidson claimed that a person can have neither 
beliefs nor concepts without having the concept BELIEF, 
and this means that the person must have some beliefs 
about beliefs, at least the most crucial belief that beliefs 
can be right or wrong.  
…[A] person cannot just believe that he or she is 
seeing a cat: in order to believe this, one must know 
what a cat is, what seeing is, and above all, one must 
recognize the possibility, however remote, that one 
may be wrong. [9;  8] 
So one cannot be an agent without having the 
concepts of belief and other related propositional 
attitudes [8, р. 396]. Davidson calls the way of 
interpreting agent’s behaviour the epistemic triangle: To 
understand the behavior of an agent the interpreter has 
to have a hypothesis about his intention and then check 
this hypothesis with respect to the external conditions of 
the world. In this way, he can verify or falsify his 
interpretation. If it is wrong, then he has to change it and 
form another hypothesis. To do this, the interpreter 
needs to possess the mechanism of thinking and 
rationalizing. In order to treat the subject’s behavior as 
rational, one cannot quit the mentalist terminology, 
because it refers to subject’s beliefs and intentions, 
which form a coherent, logical, integral whole.  
This standpoint meets a critic presented by  
E. Lepore and K. Ludwig [8]. According to them the 
recognizing whether somebody has a belief or not, 
happens by characterisation of internal state of a 
person, so by his intention. This recognizing and 
rationalizing could have a form of the condition: “If I 
intend to do A, then that is a result of this intention to 
do so.” [8, р. 396] 
This different opinion Lepore’s and Ludwig’s derives 
from the internalistic standpoint. For supporter of such 
point of view, the satisfaction conditions of attitudes must 
be represented in their content, hence internal. The way 
to recognizing that one has a concept of belief leads not 
like by Davidson from action to the concept of the action, 
but from concept of intention to action. But finally, also 
for them, one has to have concept of belief to have a 
concept of intention. So the conclusion is the same:  
One cannot be an agent without having the 
concepts of belief and other related propositional 
attitudes. [8, р. 396] 
Externalistic point of view presents Davidson. 
According to him one can recognize, that somebody 
has a belief, by an external observation of the 
behaviour of this person. And this claim has important 
consequences for the first-person authority, because it 
seems to be obvious, that the subject does not need to 
watch himself, that means, to watch his own behaviour, 
to know, that he has a belief. 
 Davidson’s starting point for investigation about 
self-knowledge is the problem of epistemic asymmetry 
in the case of ascribing current mental states by a 
subject to himself and by other persons to the subject. 
In other words the problem concerns the asymmetry 
between first and third person perspective. He claims, 
that this is the same kind of the asymmetry, which 
happens between speaker’s and interpreter’s 
knowledge about word’s meaning.  
 The main argument against that explanation says, 
that Davidson confuse the explanandum and 
explanans. Namely he will give an answer for the 
question of asymmetry between first and third person 
perspective with help of the asymmetry, which happens 
between speaker’s and interpreter’s knowledge about 
word’s meaning. So the explanans and explanandum 
are the same, namely it is still asymmetry. But the 
assymetry does not explain why the speaker always 
have a better epistemic position in knowing his own 
mind. The thesis about asymmetry is just a first step to 
the explanation, but not the explanation itself, as a 
premise is not a conclusion. 
If Davidson explains the asymmetry with the help of 
his theory of meaning, then must be said, that according 
to Davidson the meaning is dispositional. So it is to 
identify for an interpreter on the basis of speaker’s 
behaviour. This thesis has two consequences: First, that 
the knowledge about meaning has to be inferential. It 
seams to be strange in the case of self-knowledge, 
because we have direct, noninferential access to our 
mental states. But still it is not so, that we do not know 
our thoughts. We know for sure the mode of our mental 
states, like believe or desire. What we could not know 
concerns the true-value condition of the content. 
Second, that in the case of this thesis consciousness 
does not matter, but for explaining mental states it 
should. This is the third, psychological aspect of self-
knowledge. Believing, reasoning, etc. are the mind’s 
activities. Thinking is a mental process, and is thus 
psychological. But because of this aspect our reasoning, 
and also rationalizing can fail.  
Despite of it Davidson’s externalism could be called 
“naturalised” though there is a difference between 
Quine’s and Davidson’s concept of naturalisation. 
Quine uses it in reference to stimulus meaning, 
because he propagates the proximal theory of 
meaning, where the meaning has internal character. 
Davidson advocates the distal theory of meaning, 
because of the external character of meaning and 
reference to external causes, which make the causal 
history of speaker. The following thought-experiment 
became the canonical example of physical externalism: 
Suppose, that a thunder strikes a tree in a swamp 
and Davidson stands nearby. By an accident his body 
is reduced to the molecules and from different 
molecules comes in to being Davidson’s physical 
Doppelganger. The Doppelganger moves like 
Davidson’s, recognizes Davidson’s friends, calls the 
house of Davidson “home”. It seems to be no 
difference between him and Davidson. But there is a 
difference. The Doppelganger “Swampman” can not 
recognize Davidson’s friends, he can not remember the 
house, because he has different causal history. He was 
not born, grew up, he never meet the friends before. So 
he did not learn the context of using words in the same 
sense as Davidson did. 
This thought-experiment have been criticised by 
Ludwig and Lepore. It seems to be as follows: 
If we accept the radical interpretation theory in 
identification of mental states of speaker, then we need 
also an omniscient interpreter, which has to have also 
a knowledge about causal history of speaker and not 
only about actual context. Otherwise the speaker could 
have the true beliefs but the interpreter could not find 
him in agreement with oneself. So there is a 
methodological inconsistency in this thought-
experiment. It seems to be inconsistent also because 
Davidson claims the synchronic externalism. This 
experiment shows, that on mental states of the 
Swampman has had the influence also his past.  
Swampman is abnormal in two ways: his ontogeny is 
wrong and his phylogeny is wrong. It was Swampman's 
ontogeny, his personal intellectual development (the lack 
of it), his prior involvement with the world (his lack of it), 
his (missing) wider embryology as it were, that exercised 
Davidson. What exercised me, more especially, was the 
peculiar phylogenesis (the lack of it) of your newly 
created double, the fact that Doppleyou has no 
supporting evolutionary history [10, р. 93]. 
So the externalism in Millikan’s account appeals not 
only to causal history of the subject but also to his 
evolutionary story. According to her having beliefs is a 
biological function, hence burdened biological history, 
which is the main determinant of beliefs. 
 But coming back to the problem of the incomplete 
relation between a subject and an environment, 
Millikan does not give a solution of it. She does not 
accept any kind of intermediaries in the relation 
between subject and object, which are making this 
relation complete.  
The standard reference relation has the form R(x,o), 
where “x” is a subject and “o” an object in the world. 
But everybody knows the Fregean cases of mistaking 
Morning Star with Evening Star, where the both names 
refer to the same object. One can not know, that 
Morning Star is Evening Star. This person think, that 
the object, which he see mornings on the sky is 
different from the object visible evenings. But in fact it 
is the same planet, namely Venus. Frege solves the 
problem with the help of intermediaries called sense. 
Sense is the mode of presentation of the object, so one 
can have two different senses of the object, because 
sense determines his reference. So the relation has in 
fact the form R(x,s,o), where “s” stands for sense.  
So once again according to Frege, names 
(Eigennamen) have sense (Sinn) and reference 
(Bedeutung). The sense of a name is a concept which 
content is the way an object is given to us, or its mode 
of presentation (Art des Gegebenseins). The reference 
of a name is a real object. The architecture of Frege’s 
semantics on the level of the name is as follows: 
 Name 
Sense 
Concept (mode of 
presentation) 
Reference Object in the world 
Millikan does not accept this solution. She claims 
that Frege has confused the intentional contents of a 
representation, with attributes of the vehicle of 
representation. She says, that [s]omething like mingling 
of vehicle with content motivates Frege’s conception of 
Sinn or mode of presentation [11, р. 499]. 
The corn of her critic is what Garreth Evans called 
“the datum sense fallacy” or “the homunculus fallacy”: 
[…] when one attempts to explain what is involved 
in a subject’s being related to objects in the external 
world, by appealing to the existence of an inner 
situation which recapitulates the essential features of 
the original situation to be explained… by introducing a 
relation between the subject and inner objects of 
essentially the same kind of relation existing between 
the subject and outer objects [12, р. 397]. 
This error of course should be avoided. Despite of 
Millikan’s further considerations, this quotation leads to 
important question, which is relevant to our problem of 
externalism and self-knowledge: “How will the inner 
eye then perceive the inner picture? In the same way 
that the outer eye does?” [11, р. 440] And henceforth: 
“How it must move the thinking system in order to 
represent itself?” [11, р. 456] This questions are 
important, because, between a subject and his mental 
states should be no intermediary. The relation of self-
reference should be direct, otherwise there is no first-
person authority. The subject has to have direct, 
privileged access to his mental states. The question 
can be formulate now in this way: “How the subject 
“sees” his beliefs?” Or more professional: “What is for a 
subject to posses a concept?”. 
The solution of externalist problem about content 
and the first-person-authority 
Epistemological aspect of self-knowledge is 
associated mainly with the question of subject’s access 
to the content of his mental states. On the other hand 
the issue of first person authority refers to the question of 
justification of person’s own mental states with certain 
content. That means that at the very beginning, before 
the question was asked, it was assumed that the subject 
has the privileged access to his own mental states. He 
does not need to make any inferences and to refer to 
some external relations, to know what propositional 
attitude he is in. Justification of such knowledge is thus 
independent of the influence of environment on the 
subject. In general, the problem of reconciling self-
knowledge with externalism is associated with an 
acquiring the content of mental states. 
It was said, that a person can have neither beliefs 
nor concepts without having the concept BELIEF. So 
now it seems to be important to investigate the 
connection between the content of mental states and 
concepts, which are constituents of the content. This 
connection has to have implications for self-knowledge. 
I think, that without an answer to the question, “What is 
it for a subject to posses a concept?” we cannot 
answer the question, “How does a subject acquire self-
knowledge?” 
This assumption is supported by reference to 
Christopher Peacocke’s theory, which can be divided 
into two parts:  
 A theory of concepts, which answers the 
general question, “What is it for a subject to posses a 
concept?” Peacocke considers this question in A Study 
of Concepts [13]. 
 A theory of knowledge, which tries to reconcile 
the externality of content with first person authority 
understood as the infallible and incorrigible knowledge 
about our mental states. This is the main subject of 
Peacocke’s Being Known [2]. 
These two theories together show a possible way of 
acquiring self-knowledge. Peacocke thinks, that the 
constituents of propositional content are concepts that 
are individuated trough their possession conditions. 
These possession conditions together with 
determination theory tell how a given concept’s 
semantic value is fixed, and guarantee the rational 
sensitivity of a subject. This sensitivity is required for 
somebody who attributes propositional attitudes with a 
particular content to himself or another. In other words, 
rational sensitivity is sensitivity to the satisfaction of the 
possession condition for the concepts in the content 
attributed.  
Self-knowledge is a special case of knowledge, yet 
it still rests on possession conditions for concepts 
describing our mental states. To say, “I believe that I 
believe,” we have to have the concept of belief. But it is 
not enough to state that making these judgments itself 
makes them true. There is still a question: Why does 
making judgments about our own mental states itself 
make them true? The answer is given in the last thesis: 
Our distinctive ways of coming to knowledgeable 
self-ascribed beliefs are correct methods because of 
the nature of belief. [15, р. 102] 
If self-knowledge is a special case of knowledge, 
then to have self-knowledge means: 
To have reasons for a belief, which ensure its truth, is 
a consequence of the nature of the concepts it contains. 
This is the best epistemic position to have the knowledge 
about our own mental states, but this is only a special 
case of some more general phenomenon [13, р. 158]. 
Therefore if the subject is rational, then is he able to 
make transitions between contents of fist-level beliefs 
to the content of second-level beliefs. It is allowed by 
the very nature of such a content, because the content 
holds the true-value, from the basic content. This 
explanation leads to conclusion about some hidden 
inference in first person knowledge. But this solutions 
allows also to integrate the externalism about content 
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А. Пахолік – Журомська 
ПРОБЛЕМИ САМОПІЗНАННЯ : ІНАКТИВІЗМ ЯК НОВА ВЕРСІЯ ЕКСТЕРНАЛІЗМУ 
Основна тема статті стосується питання : чи може самопізнання все ще бути авторитетним з точки зору інактивізму ? Дана 
проблема грунтується на двох припущеннях : 1 ) визначення самопізнання свідчить, що суб'єкт отримує безпосереднє 
знання про його интенциональном змісті установок; 2 ) зміст установок суб'єкта визначено зовнішніми факторами , які 
можуть бути невідомими для суб'єкта. Це означає , що суб'єкт має обмежений доступ до даного утримання чи його 
детермінанти розуміються як умови задоволення його ментальних станів . На основі цього очевидного конфлікту між двома 
тезами авторитет першої особи може бути поставлений під сумнів. 
 
А. Пахолик-Журомская 
ПРОБЛЕМЫ САМОПОЗНАНИЯ: ИНАКТИВИЗМ КАК НОВАЯ ВЕРСИЯ ЭКСТЕРНАЛИЗМА 
Основная тема статьи касается вопроса: может ли самопознание все еще быть авторитетным с точки зрения инактивизма? 
Данная проблема основывается на двух предположениях: 1) определение самопознания гласит, что субъект получает 
непосредственное знание о его интенциональном содержании установок; 2) содержание установок субъекта определено 
внешними факторами, которые могут быть неизвестными для субъекта. Это значит, что субъект имеет ограниченный 
доступ к данному содержанию или его детерминанты понимаются как условия удовлетворения его ментальных состояний. 
На основе этого очевидного конфликта между двумя тезисами авторитет первого лица может быть поставлен под 
сомнение. 
 
